Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1961

James Siciliano v. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Co. : Petition for Rehearing and
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Clarence M. Beck; George M. McMillan; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Siciliano v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., No. 9378 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3851

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

f \1
JAMES SICILIANO,

,;.,

""'1

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

--.
~
' .- '
Clcr~. ~up,· ~ c;;~

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

________...... .
No.
. ;,ah

9378

Defendant and Appellant.

Petition for Rehearing and Brief

CLARENCE M. BECK
Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Petitioner

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF POINTS
Page
PETITION FOR REHEARING --------------------------------------------

1

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING
ITS VIEW OF THE FACTS FOR THAT OF THE
JURY. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
INSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT THAT HE DID
NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF EMPLOYER NEGLIGENCE. --------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Anno. 4. L.Ed ( 2d) 1787, Note 8 ------------------------------------------

5

Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F.R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 360 1
L.Ed ( 2d) 889, 77 S. Ct. 840 ------------------------------------ 5
Butler v. Whitman (1958) 356 U.S. 271, 2 L.Ed(2d) 754,
78 S. Ct. 734 ---------------------------------------------------------------Connor v. Butler (1959) 361 U.S. 29, 4 L.Ed(2d) 10, 80
S. Ct. 21 ---------------------------------------------------------------------Davis v. Virginian R. R. Co. (1960) 361 U.S. 354, 4 L.Ed
( 2d) 366, 8o s. ·ct. 387 ---------------------------------------------Deen v. Gulf C. & S.F.R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 925, 1 L.Ed
( 2d) 721, 77 S. Ct. 715 ---------------------------------------------Ferguson v. St. Louis-San Fran R. Co. ( 1958) 356 U.S. 41,
2 L.Ed ( 2d) 571, 78 S. Ct. 671 ------------------------------------

5
5

s
4
5

Futrelle v. Atl. Coast LineR. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1
L.Ed ( 2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 682 -------------------------------------- 4
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gibson v. Thompson (1957) 355 U.S. 18, 2 L.Ed(2d) 1,
78 S. Ct. 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
Harris v. Penn. R.R. Co. (1959) 361 U.S. 15, 4 L.Ed(2d)
1 80 S. Ct. 22 --------------------------------------------------------------5, 6
Honeycutt v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1958) 355 U.S. 424, 2
L.Ed ( 2d) 380, 78 S. Ct. 393, 303 SW ( 2d) 15 3 -------- 5
Larsen v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. (1948) CCA 7, 171 F
( 2d) 841, 846 ------------------------------------------------------------ 11
McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. Co. (1957) 354 U.S. 517,
1 L.Ed ( 2d) 20, 81 S. Ct. 1398 ------------------------------------ 5
Moore v. Terminal R.R. Assn. (1958) 358 U.S. 31 3 L.Ed
( 2d) 24, 78 S. Ct. 2 ---------------------------------------------------- 5
Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co. (1957) 354 U.S. 901,
1 L. Ed ( 2d) 1268, 77 S. Ct. 109 3 ------------------------------ 5
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 500, 1
L.Ed(2d) 493, 77 S. Ct. 443, reh. d. 353 U.S. 943,
1 L.Ed ( 2d) 764, 77 S. Ct. 808 --------------------------------4, 5, 6
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp. ( 1959) 361
U.S. 107, 4 L.Ed(2d) 142, 80S. Ct. 173 -------------------- 5
Shaw v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1
L.Ed ( 2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 680 -------------------------------------Texas & Pac. R.R. vs. Buckles CCA 5 (1956) 232 F(2d)
257 (1955) 351 U.S. 984, 100 L.Ed. 1498, 76 S. Ct.
10 52 ------------------------------------------------------------------------11,
Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. (1943) 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct.
444, 8 7 L.Ed 610 -----------------------------··------------------------7,
Thomson v. Texas & Pac. R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 926, 1 L.
Ed ( 2d) 722, 77 S. Ct. 698 ------------------------------------------

4

12
10
4

U.S. Reporter 614 L.Ed ---------------------------------------------------------- 7
Wantland v. Ill. Cen. R.R. Co. (1956) CCA 7, 237 F(2d)
921' 926 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Webb v. Ill. Cen. R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 512, 1 L.Ed(2d)
503, 77 S. Ct. 451 ----------------------------------------------------4, 5, 6

..

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES SICILIANO,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

9378

Defendant and Appellant.

Petition for Rehearing and Brief

PETITION FOR REHEARING
James Siciliano, by his attorneys, respectfully petitions the
above entitled Court for a rehearing and that the decision of
the Court rendered August 24 in the above entitled case be
reversed upon the grounds and for the reasons as follows:
1. The Court erred in ruling that there was no evidence

of negligence upon which liability could be predicated.

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2. The Court erred in substituting its interpretation of the

facts for the interpretation necessarily adopted by the jury.
3. The Court erred in holding that the instruction on
assumed risk constituted preju~icial error in this case.
4. The errors of the Court deprived the plaintiff of rights
given to him by the statutes and Constitution of the United
States.

WHEREFORE plaintiff and respondent prays that the
Court make and enter its order granting a rehearing to plaintiff
and respondent and reversing the decision of the Court entered
herein on August 24, 1961, and reinstating the judgment of the
District Court.
CLARENCE M. BECK
Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Petitioner
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS
VIEW OF THE FAC1·s FOR THAT OF THE JURY.
THE

Specifications of error described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4
of the petition for rehearing are treated together in this portion
of the argument.
The facts in this case were susceptible to two interpretations:
1. The coil of wire was hung in a position of tension or

spring with its ends held under among the strands. That such
a piece of equipment is unsafe for ordinary use - that it constitutes a trap - requires no elaboration. This was the plaintiff's theory.
2. The coil of wire was hung with loose ends without

tension in the manner wire is ordinarily hung in industrial
plants. This was the defendant's theory.
The defendant did not offer evidence, as the majority
implies, that the prevailing practice was to hang coils of wire
in a position of spring or tension with the ends locked under
or among the coils.
The jury was instructed that the hanging of a coil of wire
with loose ends upon a post could not in and of itself constitute negligence (Court Instruction No. 20, R. 58), but
(!whether or not the manner in which this wire was hung on
the post is negligence is for you to determine based upon all of
the evidence and such reasonable inferences as may be drawn"
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(ibid.) . Thus the jury was instructed that there could be no
negligence on the defendant's theory. The jury necessarily
adopted the plaintiff's theory and necessarily determined that
the coil of wire in the particular circumstance of this lawsuit
constituted a trap and was not a safe piece of equipment.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly, uniformly
and pointedly held that the only question which the appellate
court should review in considering whether the judgment is
supported by evidence is whether the jury could find that employer negligence played any part at all in producing the injury,
or stated another way, whether there is any evidence which with
reason could be said to support the jury's findings.
Judges
are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and if
that test is made are bound to find that a case is made out,
whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other
possibilities." Rogers v. Missouri R.R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 500,
1 L.Ed (2d) 493, 77 S. Ct. 443; rehearing denied 353 U.S. 941,
1 L.Ed ( 2d) 764, 77 S. Ct. 808.
tl • • •

One cannot read the cases following the Rogers case and
have any doubt that its teaching represents the firm and considered judgment of the rna jority of the Court in cases of
this kind.
Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 512, 1 L.Ed
(2d) 503, 77 S. Ct. 451; Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
(1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed (2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 680; Futrelle
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed
(2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 682; Deen v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (1957)
353 U.S. 925, 1 L.Ed (2d) 721, 77 S. Ct. 715; Thomson v.
Texas & Pac. R. Co. (1957) 353 U.S. 926, 1 L.Ed (2d) 722,
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77 S. Ct. 698; Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. R. Co. (1957) 353
U.S. 360, 1 L.Ed (2d) 889, 77 S. Ct. 840; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. (1957) 354 U.S. 901, 1 L. Ed (2d) 1286,
77 S. Ct. 1093; McBride v. 1·oledo Terminal R. Co. ( 1957) 354
U.S. 517, 1 L.Ed (2d) 1534, 77 S. Ct. 1398; Gibson v. Thompson ( 1957) 355 U.S. 18, 2 L.Ed (2d) 1, 78 S. Ct. 2; Honeycutt v. Wabash R. Co. (1958) 355 U.S. 424, 2 L.Ed (2d) 380,
78 S. Ct. 393; Ferguson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. ( 1958)
356 U.S. 41, 2 L.Ed (2d) 571, 78 S. Ct. 671; Butler v. Whitman
(1958) 356 U.S. 271, 2 L.Ed (2d) 754, 78 S. Ct. 734; Moore
v. Terminal R.R. Assn. (1958) 358 U.S. 31, 3 L.Ed (2d) 24,
79 S. Ct. 2; Harris v. Penn. R.R. Co. (1959) 361 U.S. 15,
4 L.Ed (2d) 1, 80S. Ct. 22; Conner v. Butler (1959) 361 U.S.
29, .:i L.Ed (2d) 10, 80 S. Ct. 21; Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean
Shipping Corp. (1959) 361 U.S. 107, 4 L.Ed (2d) 142, 80
S. Ct. 173; Davis v. Virginian Railway Co. ( 1960) 361 U.S.
354, 4 L.Ed (2d) 366, 80 S. Ct. 387. Failure of the majority
to refer to a single case since Rogers is significant, particularly
in view of the authoritative suggestion that cc • • • earlier cases
... should be examined in the light of the Rogers and Webb
cases." Anno. 4 L.Ed ( 2d) 1787 at Note 8. It is submitted that
Conner v. Butler,. supra, for instance, cannot be distinguished
in principle.
Rather than considering the simple question upon which
appellate judges are counseled to (tfix their sights," the majority
of the Court in the case at bar was apparently misled by a
consideration of ((insurer'' liability. The plaintiff in this case
has never claimed that the defendant was an insurer. The jury
was expressly instructed upon the defendants own request (De£.
Request No. 1, R. 23) that the defendant was not an insurer

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of plaintiff's safety (Instruction No. 10, R. 48). It is equally
clear, however, that as a matter of law, the plaintiff is not an
"insurer" of his own safety. In this connection the defendant
itself effectively proved on cross examination of plaintiff that
he did not anticipate and could not have foreseen the dangerous
condition of the coil of wire as it hung upon the nail. Yet the
effect of the decision of this Court effectively requires the plaintiff to assume the total burden of his loss.
Instead of deciding the case upon the tangent of insurer
consideration - a theory not in issue in the case - it is submitted that the attention of the Court should focus on two
simple questions:
1. Can this Court find as a matter of law that the coil of

wrie was not in a position of tension as a trap as was necessarily
found by the jury?
2. Can this Court find as a matter of law that a coil of

wire hanging on a nail as a trap in a position of spring or tension
was a safe piece of equipment?
An affirmative answer to either of these questions simply
cannot withstand objective scrutiny.
The United State Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
substitution of the judgment of an appellate court for that
of a jury, rather than a determination as to whether the jury's
theory could be supported on any reasonable basis, constitutes
impairment of a federal right. Note 13, Rogers v. Mo. R.R.
supra and the cases cited supra, beginning with Webb v. Ill.
Cent. R.R. See opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Harris v.
Penn. R.R. Co., supra.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT THAT HE DID NOT
ASSUME THE RISK OF EMPLOYER NEGLIGENCE.
The Court's discussion of the instruction on assumption
of risk evidences unwarranted solicitude for the railroad company. Inasmuch as the holding that the judgment was not
supported by competent evidence would have disposed of the
case and no new trial would be possible if that theory prevails,
the discussion of assumption of risk is pure dicta. It is a gratuity
to the defendant.
The majority admits that the issue of assumption of risk
may be raised by the evidence and inferences from the evidence
as well as by pleadings. In such a case, says the rna jority, a
"cautionary instruction" may be appropriate so that improper
inferences may be ccdispelled." There is no explanation in the
opinion as to why this case falls outside that description.
The opinion of /Mr. Justice Black in the case cited by the
majority, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. (1943) 318 U.S.
54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed 610, contains a resume of the history
of the assumption of risk doctrine. Both historically and practically, the doctrine was intertwined with considerations contributory negligence. Originally the concepts were loosely interchangeable. In fact, the very reason for the adoption of the
1939 amendment was the insurmountable ((difficulty in distinguishing between contributory negligence and assumption
of risk" as a result of the ((niceties if not the casuistries of distinguishing between (them)" (ibid. page 63, U.S. Reporter
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614, L.Ed). As a result of the amendment, it is now clear that
an employee does not assume the risk of employer negligence.
Prior refinements were discarded.
The majority's confidence in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
((coup" is misplaced. All that he said in its context, and leaving
aside the professorial embellishments, was that an employee
did not assume the risk of employer negligence. If in some other
sense the term ((assumption of risk" may be a ((hazardous legal
tool," how can it ((create confusion" in the sense and context
in which it was used by the trial court here:
nyou are instructed that at the time of the incident
we are concerned with, both plaintiff and defendant
were engaged in interstate commerce, and plaintiffs
claim for recovery is therefore governed by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. This act provides in substance
that every common carrier railroad shall be liable in
damages to any employee who suffers injury while
employed by such carrier, resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its appliances,
machinery or equipment, except where the injury results
solely from the negligence of the one so injured.

((Any such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment occasioned by such
negligence.
((In actions against such carrier, the fact that the
injured employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount
of negligence, if any, attributable to such employee.
((Under this statute, the test of liability is simply
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion
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that the negligence of the defendant employer played
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury for
which damages are sought.
CCI£ the injury is caused solely by the negligence of
the employee, or if the defendant is not negligent, then,
of course, no recovery may be had by said employee."
The defense in this case was in substance that the wire
was hung with loose ends on a nail in accordance with accepted
industry practice. Defendant asserted that the plaintiff negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiffs
position was that the coil was in a position of tension or spring
with the ends locked among or beneath the strands so that when
the weight was released from the ends of the coil, one of them
flipped into plaintiff's eye.
The defendant requested that the Court give an instruction
that the defendant was not an insurer. (Defendant's Requested
Instructions 1 and 13, R. 23, 33; Court's Instruction No. 10,
R. 48.) The Court instructed the jury in substance that if the
coil of wire was hung in accordance with generally accepted
practice, defendant could not be liable. How could the Court's
instruction on the assumption of risk mean more in its context
than this: CtPlaintiff did not assume the risk of the use of the
coil of wire if it was unsafe for ordinary use."
There was a careful, painstaking description of negligence,
contributory negligence, proximate cause, and the Court explained to the jury that cc • • • the law recognizes that injuries
to an employee can occur during the course of his work without
fault or negligence on the part of either the railroad or the
employee.
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tel£ you believe from the evidence that Mr. Siciliano's
injuries were caused by accident and without negligence on the
part of the railroad, then you must return a verdict in favor
of the railroad and against the plaintiff
" (Instr. No. 8,

R. 46).
Thus the assumption of risk issue, at least insofar as it is
intertwined with contributory negligence, was raised by defendant's evidence and the inference it claimed for its evidence.
The instruction as given in its context cannot be said to be error,
let alone be confusing.
Even, however, if we accept the majority's premise for the
argument and assume that the issue was not raised here by
evidence or inferences, the giving of the instruction can hardly
be said to be prejudicial. Defendant requested, and the Court
gave, presumably as a ((cautionary instruction," Instruction
No. 8 that te ... the railroad company is not an insurer of the
safety of its employees." How did that issue become relevant?
Who placed it in the case? Plaintiff has never claimed, either
directly or by inference, that defendant was an insurer.
If the defendant is entitled to have an instruction that it
is not an insurer, a straw man issue which it invented itself,
how does it become prejudicial for plaintiff to have a °Cautionary instruction" that plaintiff does not assume the risk of
defendant's negligence?
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled that the
plaintiff is not entitled to instruction along the lines of that
given here. In Tiller v. Atlantic supra the ruling was that
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction that plaintiff
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assumed a risk of employment, and in Texas & Pac. R.R. v.
Buckles CCA 5 ( 1956) 232 F (2d) 257, the other federal case
cited by the majority opinion in the case at bar, the ruling was
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction that plaintiff
assumed any risk of employment. It does not follow that a
plaintiff is not entiled to a suitable instruction that he does not
assume the risk of employer negligence. In fact, in the Texas
& Pac. R.R. case, supra} which the majority says applies the
Frankfurter language, the following instruction was held
"clearly correct" (p. 263, Note 13):

CCWe now instruct you on the question of assumption
of risk. In any suit brought against a railroad under this
law to recover damages for injury to an employee, such
employee does not assume any of the risks of his employment in any case where the injury resulted, in whole
or in part, from the negligence of any of the agents
or employees of the railroad."
The Seventh Circuit has ruled twice that the giving of an
instruction similar to that given in the case at bar at the request
of an employee was not erroneous. Larsen v. Chicago and
N.W. R. Co. (1948) CAA 7, 171 F (2d) 841, 846; Wantland
v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1956) CCA 7, 237 F (2d) 921,
926. In the latter case the Court stated:
CThe Railroad also insists that the trial court erred
in instructing the jury that the Federal Employers Liability Act provides that an employee shall not be held
to have assumed the risk of his employment. This court
had occasion to pass on a similar contention in Larsen
v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 7 Cir. 171 F. 2d 841, 846,
where it was held that such an instruction was not
erroneous.''
c
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The opinion of the majority here upon the instruction in
question is squarely opposed to the opinions of two circuit
courts. Rights under a federal statute being in issue, the Federal Rules should prevail. Moreover, the holding of the Fifth
Circuit in the Texas & Pac. R.R. case relied upon by the majority
is squarely against it. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
that case. ( 1955) 351 U.S. 984, 100 LEd. 1498, 76 S. Ct. 1052.
The judgment herein dated August 24 should be reversed;
the opinion should be withdrawn. The judgment of the District
Court should be reinstated and affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE M. BECK
Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Petitioner
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